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ARTHUR M. OKUN died unexpectedly  from a heart attack  on March  23, 
1980, in Washington,  D.C., at the age of fifty-one.  The nation  has lost its 
most inventive  and effective  policy economist  in his prime. His death 
came  just  six weeks  before  the tenth  anniversary  meeting  of the  Brookings 
Panel on Economic  Activity,  and just months  before the completion  of 
his long-awaited book, Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic Anal- 
ysis. 
Okun was set apart  from his peers by a unique range of skills. His 
intellectual  powers  could cut through  to the essence  of a complex  prob- 
lem. His common  sense  combined  with  deep  insight  could  uncover  central 
relationships  while avoiding  academic  fads and techniques  for their  own 
sake. His command  of the facts on the American  economy added im- 
measurably  to his effectiveness  both in scholarly  discussions  and in his 
many dealings  with policymakers.  His entrepreneurial  energy and edi- 
torial  devotion  helped  build Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity 
within  a decade  into one of the four most-circulated  academic  economic 
journals  and made it an indispensable  vehicle for the dissemination  of 
new macroeconomic  insights.  His graceful  pen and  flair  for phrasemaking 
made him the most quoted and influential  opinion molder of the last 
decade.  His honesty,  warmth,  and modesty  brought  the admiration  of all 
who knew  him. 
As recently  minted  Ph.D.'s from  M.I.T., we first  came in contact  with 
Art Okun in 1969 when he enlisted  our participation  in a unique new 
venture  he was then starting  with George  Perry.  A group  of economists, 
including  us, some of our graduate  school classmates,  Okun,  Perry, and 
0007-2303/80/0001-0005$01.00/0  i)  Brookings Instittution 2  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1980 
others,  would  come  together  three  times  a year  for a series  of conferences 
on macroeconomic  issues.  Each of the panel  members  would  be responsi- 
ble for a major  paper  during  the year  that  would  bring  the latest  quantita- 
tive techniques  to bear on outstanding  current  macroeconomic  contro- 
versies while presenting  the results in a form suitable  for the educated 
public. 
When  our turns  came in 1970 we submitted  our first  drafts  and were 
promptly  astonished  by the reaction  of the editors.  This was not to be an 
ordinary  conference  volume where an author's  random thoughts and 
whims  would  be published  intact.  This was not to be an ordinary  journal 
where a curt referee's  report  was the only editorial  input. Instead, our 
drafts were scrutinized  by the Okun-Perry  editorial microscope,  with 
assumptions  challenged,  omissions protested,  contradictory  results un- 
covered.  Then, after our second drafts  had been distributed,  came that 
dreaded  moment at the meeting  when we sat down at our places and 
opened an envelope  containing  a typed  memo  from  Art, revealing  a new 
set of flaws  in the second draft  and reminding  us of all those in the first 
draft  that had not yet been fixed. After the meeting  an author  was held 
prisoner  at Brookings  until  the paper  made  yet another  step toward  meet- 
ing the editors'  standards.  At every  stage, the pressure  was not so much 
for beautiful  prose as for good sound  economics,  well explained  and well 
documented.  Then, most amazing  of all, a printed  journal  appeared  in 
our mailboxes  a scant  two months  after  the meeting. 
The success of Brookings  Papers during  the past decade rested on 
more than editorial  rigor  and administrative  efficiency.  The selection  of 
panel members  was important,  particularly  the willingness  to gamble  on 
young  unknowns  fresh  from  graduate  school in preference  to established 
stars.  The selection of topics was important,  displaying  an unerring  in- 
stinct  for issues  that  were  both  timely  and  of lasting  interest.  The "Editors' 
Summary"  was important,  allowing the Okun-Perry  pen to translate 
academic  gibberish  into a few comprehensible  paragraphs,  particularly 
when the practical  realities  of discourse  among economists  overturned 
the early  rules  against  equations  and  Greek  letters. 
Art had a marvelous  sense of humor  that he always  subordinated  to 
the real point  he was trying  to make.  He rarely  made  jokes for their  own 
sake.  At the first  meeting  of the Brookings  panel in 1970, one of us gave 
a short paper on the then-developing  recession.  For us, it was the first 
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to what seemed  unique features.  Art listened with his customary  close 
attention  and  finally  said, "Ah, now I see what you are saying-this  flat 
tire is special  because  it is flat on the bottom."  He loved to coin colorful 
nicknames  for  new  concepts  and  findings-we still  think  of George  Perry's 
discovery  of the cyclical  sensitivity  of the probability  of a job-quitter  be- 
coming  unemployed  as the "Perry  Pothole,"  thanks  to Art. 
The quality  of Okun's  mind  was revealed  at Brookings  panel  meetings 
when, impatient  at a confused comment,  he interrupted  to restate the 
point  clearly,  one of several  talents  that  he shared  with  Milton  Friedman. 
As another  sign  of intellectual  leadership,  Okun  was a member  of a small 
group  of outstanding  senior economists  whom we felt our own research 
had to convince  if it was to have lasting  merit.  Art's  position  at the top of 
his profession  did not rest  on abstract  mathematical  or econometric  inno- 
vations but on his ability to combine a central question  with his own 
intuition  and an internal  encyclopedia  of facts to come up with a new 
answer.  Okun relished  serious  engagements  with the new breed of anti- 
Keynesian  economists.  He took a thoughtful  position  on rational  expec- 
tations  in the labor  market: He was fully  prepared  to grant  the rationality 
of expectations,  but denied the simple connection  between expectations 
and wage inflation.  To him, the mystery  of the momentum  of inflation 
was not solved  by the mere  invocation  of expectations. 
Undergraduate  students  of macroeconomics  link Okun's name with 
Okun's  Law, which states that the unemployment  rate moves by one- 
third  as much  as the gap between  actual  and potential  real GNP. Okun's 
Law has been of immense  value  to forecasters  who need to translate  out- 
put changes  into  predictions  about  unemployment.  More  tllan  just a fore- 
casting  shortcut,  it calls attention  to the paradox  of fluctuations  in output 
that are out of proportion  to fluctuations  in employment.  The demise  of 
the law has been announced  prematurely  by journalists,  because  in fact 
unemployment  and  the GNP gap seem to have been related  as closely in 
the 1970s as in the 1950s and 1960s. The appearance  of an overly  rapid 
decline  in the unemployment  rate  in 1977 and 1978 reflected  the slowing 
growth  rate  of potential  GNP and the fact that the responsiveness  of un- 
employment  to the gap  had actually  always been closer  to 0.45 than  0.33 
throughout  the postwar  era. In fact,  we suspect  that  this modified  version 
of Okun's  Law  will prove  to be indispensable  in tracking  the evolution  of 
the 1980 recession. 
The distinction  between auction and customer  markets  by Okun in 4  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1980 
BPEA, 2:1975  is as important  to economic  theorists  as Okun's  Law is to 
short-term  forecasters.  That paper provided  a verbal model of pricing 
practices  in product  markets  based  on long-term  relations  between  sellers 
and  buyers  and  of wage setting  in labor  markets  based  on career  connec- 
tions between  workers  and firms.  As developed  further  in Okun's  Prices 
and Quantities,  these ideas will help to provide the underpinning  of a 
new and more  rigorous  macroeconomics  for the 1980s. 
In recent years Okun became convinced  that inflation  was a social 
problem  deserving  more  serious  concern  than  macroeconomists  generally 
gave it. But he lost none of his earlier  conviction  about  the heavy social 
costs of operating  the economy below potential.  He insisted  that there 
must  be a better  way to slow inflation  than deliberate  recession.  His in- 
ventive  and articulate  advocacy  of tax-based  incomes  policies and mea- 
sures  to promote  supply-side  cost reductions  reflected  both his view that 
recessions  cost the public  hundreds  of billions  of dollars  and his unwill- 
ingness  to saddle  the poorer  members  of society  with  the consequences  of 
recession.  His own research  convinced  him that a high-pressure  economy 
encouraged  firms to provide training  for society's underprivileged  and 
that a low-pressure  economy  eroded  those gains. 
When Okun challenged  economists and the public to rethink  their 
choice  between  equality  and  efficiency,  he coined  one of his many  famous 
phrases,  the "leaky  bucket experiment,"  in which people are to reveal 
their  trade-offs  between  equality  and efficiency  by stating  how much  they 
would be willing to tolerate inefficiency  leaks from the transfer  bucket 
en route from rich to poor. Other  inventions  of Okun the phrasemaker 
were  the economic  "discomfort  index"  that sums  the inflation  and  unem- 
ployment  rates, the "invisible  handshake"  to describe  implicit  contracts 
in product  and labor markets,  and "carrot-TIPped"  incomes  policies.  A 
phrase  we recall vividly, and one that is eerily appropriate  at this mo- 
ment,  was his description  early  in 1975 of an economy  in "free  fall." 
Okun's  rare  combination  of careful  thought  and inspired  writing  style 
sometimes  made us impatient  that he took so long to finish his forth- 
coming  book on prices and quantities.  But that delay reflects  his open 
door to colleagues, his open telephone to inquisitive  journalists  and 
policymakers,  and  his self-sacrifice  in devoting  so much  of himself,  with- 
out acknowledgment,  to authors  of Brookings  Papers  and to the educa- 
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We end on a note of appreciation,  because  we had the good fortune  to 
learn from Art Okun during  twenty-eight  consecutive  meetings of the 
Brookings  panel, and on a note of sorrow,  because  we must now face a 
future empty of his wisdom and counsel. The nation and world share 
our loss. 
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